Inclusion logic is a variant of dependence logic that was shown to have the same expressive power as positive greatest fixed-point logic. Inclusion logic is not axiomatizable in full, but its first-order consequences can be axiomatized. In this paper, we provide such an explicit partial axiomatization by introducing a system of natural deduction for inclusion logic that is sound and complete for first-order consequences in inclusion logic.
Introduction
In this paper, we axiomatize first-order consequences of inclusion logic. Inclusion logic was introduced by Galliani [6] as a variant of dependence logic introduced by Väänänen [29] . Another important variant of dependence logic is independence logic, introduced by Grädel and Väänänen [11] . Dependence logic and its variants adopt the framework of team semantics of Hodges [21, 22] to characterize dependency notions. Inclusion logic aims to characterize inclusion dependencies by extending first-order logic with inclusion atoms, which are strings of the form x 1 . . . x n ⊆ y 1 . . . y n , where x 1 , . . . , x n = x and y 1 , . . . , y n = y are sequences of variables of the same length. With team semantics inclusion atoms and other formulas are evaluated in a model with respect to sets of assignments (called teams), in contrast to single assignments as in the usual first-order logic. Intuitively the inclusion atom x ⊆ y specifies that all possible values for x in a team X are included in the values of y in the same team X.
Galliani and Hella proved that inclusion logic is expressively equivalent to positive greatest fixed-point logic [8] . It then follows from the results of Immerman [23] and Vardi [31] that over finite ordered structures inclusion logic captures PTIME. Building on these results, Grädel defined model-checking games for inclusion logic [9] , which then found application in [10] . There also emerged some studies [13, 14, 16, 27] on the computational complexity and syntactical fragments of inclusion logic. Embedding the semantics of inclusion atoms into that of the quantifiers, Rönnholm [28] introduced the interesting inclusion quantifiers that generalize the idea of the slashed quantifiers of independence-friendly logic [20] (a close relative to dependence logic). Inclusion atoms have also found natural applications also in a recent formalization of Arrow's Theorem in social choice in dependence and independence logic [26] . Motivated by the increasing interest in inclusion logic, we present in this paper a proof-theoretic investigation of inclusion logic, which is currently missing in the literature.
It is worth noting that inclusion atoms correspond exactly to the inclusion dependencies studied in database theory. The implication problem of inclusion dependencies, i.e., the problem of deciding whether Γ |= φ for a set Γ ∪ {φ } of inclusion dependencies (or inclusion atoms), is completely axiomatized in [4] by the following three rules/axioms:
• x 1 . . . x n ⊆ y 1 . . . y n /x i 1 . . . x i k ⊆ y i 1 . . . y i k for i 1 , . . . , i k ∈ {1, . . . , n} (projection and permutation)
• x ⊆ y, y ⊆ z/x ⊆ z (transitivity)
The team semantics interpretation for inclusion atoms has recently been ulitized to study also the implication problems of inclusion atoms together with other dependency atoms [15, 18, 19] . In this paper, we study, instead, the axiomatization problem of inclusion logic, inclusion atoms enriched with connectives and quantifiers of firstorder logic, that is, the problem of finding a deduction system for which the completeness theorem Γ |= φ ⇐⇒ Γ ⊢ φ (1) holds for Γ ∪ {φ } being a set of formulas of the logic. It is known that dependence logic is not (effectively) axiomatizable, since the sentences of the logic are equiexpressive with sentences of existential second-order logic (ESO) [29] . Nevertheless, if one restrict the consequence φ in (1) to a first-order sentence and Γ to a set of sentences in dependence logic, the axiomatization can be found. This is because, finding a model for such a set Γ ∪ {¬φ } of sentences of dependence logic is the same as finding a model for a set of ESO sentences (i.e., sentences of the form ∃ f 1 . . . f n α for some first-order α), which is then reduced to finding a model for a set of first-order sentences (of the form α). A concrete system of natural deduction for dependence logic admitting this type of completeness theorem was given in [25] . The proof of the completeness theorem uses a nontrivial technique that involves showing the equivalence between a dependence logic sentence and its so-called game expression (an infinitary first-order sentence describing a semantic game) over countable models, and the fact that the game expression can be finitely approximated over recursively saturated models. Subsequently, using the similar method a system of natural deduction axiomatizing completely the first-order consequences in independence logic with respect to sentences was also introduced [12] . These partial axiomatizations for sentences were first generalized in [24] to cover the cases for formulas by expanding the language with a new predicate symbol to interpret the teams, and later generalized further in [32] to cover the case when the consequence φ in (1) is not necessarily first-order itself but has an essentially first-order translation by applying a trick that involves the weak classical negation∼ and the addition of the RAA rule for∼.
As we will demonstrate formally in this paper, inclusion logic is not (effectively) axiomatizable either. Since inclusion logic is less expressive than ESO, by the same argument as above, the first-order consequences of inclusion logic can also be axiomatized. In this paper, we give explicitly such an axiomatization. To be more precise, we introduce a system of natural deduction for inclusion logic for which the completeness theorem (1) holds for φ being a first-order formula and Γ being a set of Inc-formulas. Our completeness proof uses the technique developed in [25] together with the trick in [32] . Our system of inclusion logic is a conservative extension of the system of first-order logic, as it has the same rules as that of first-order logic when restricted to first-order formulas only. The rules for inclusion atoms include some of those introduced in [12] , and the rules characterizing interactions between inclusion atoms and the connectives and quantifiers appear to be simpler than the corresponding ones in the systems of dependence and independence logic [12, 25] . We also show that the crucial rule, the RAA rule for∼, needed for the trick of [32] is actually derivable in our system with respect to first-order formulas.
The paper is organized as follows. In Section 2 we recall the basics of inclusion logic, and also give a formal proof that inclusion logic is not (effectively) axiomatizable. Section 3 discusses the normal form for inclusion logic. In Section 4, we define the game expressions and their finite approximations that are crucial for the proof of the completeness theorem of the system of natural deduction for inclusion logic. We introduce this system in Section 5, and also prove the soundness theorem as well as some useful derivable clauses in the section. The proof of the completeness theorem will be given in Section 6. We conclude with Section 7 showing some applications of our system, in particular, we derive in our system the axioms for anonymity atoms proposed recently by Väänänen [30] .
Preliminaries
In this section, we recall the basics of inclusion logic and prove formally that inclusion logic is not (effectively) axiomatizable. We consider first-order signatures L with a built-in equality symbol =. Fix a set Var of first-order variables, and denote its elements by u, v, w, x, y, . . . (with or without subscripts). First-order L -terms t are built recursively as usual, and first-order L -formulas α are defined by the grammar:
Throughout the paper, we reserve the first greek letters α, β , γ, δ (with or without subscripts) for first-order formulas. As usual, we define α → β := ¬α ∨ β and α ↔ β := (α → β ) ∧ (β → α) for first-order formulas α and β . Formulas φ of inclusion logic (Inc) are defined recursively as follows:
where α is an arbitrary first-order formula. The formula x 1 · · · x n ⊆ y 1 . . . y n is called an inclusion atom, and note that negation in Inc applies only to first-order formulas.
The set Fv(φ ) of free variables of an Inc-formula φ is defined inductively as usual except that we now have the new case
We write φ (x 1 , . . . , x k ) to indicate that the free variables of φ are among x 1 , . . . , x k . Inc-formulas with no free variable are called sentences.
We assume that the domain of a first-order model M has at least two elements, and use the same letter M to stand for both the model and its domain. An assignment of a L -model M for a set V ⊆ Var of variables is a function s : V → M. The interpretation of an L -term t under M and s is defined as usual and denoted as s(t M ). For any sequence x = x 1 , . . . , x k of variables, we write s(
A set X of assignments of a model M with the same domain dom(X) is called a team (of M). In particular, the empty set / 0 is a team, and the singleton { / 0} is a team with the empty domain.
we define the satisfaction relation M |= X φ inductively as follows:
• M |= X α iff for all s ∈ X, M |= s α in the usual sense.
• M |= X ¬α iff for all s ∈ X, M |= s α in the usual sense.
• M |= X x ⊆ y iff for all s ∈ X, there is s ′ ∈ X such that s(x) = s ′ (y).
• M |= X φ ∧ ψ iff M |= X φ and M |= X ψ.
•
We write Γ |= φ if M |= X ψ for all ψ ∈ Γ implies M |= X φ for all models M and teams X. We write simply |= φ for / 0 |= φ , and ψ |= φ for {ψ} |= φ . If both φ |= ψ and ψ |= φ , we wire φ ≡ ψ. Our version of the team semantics for disjunction and existential quantifier is known in the literature as lax semantics; see [6] for further discussion. In some literature (e.g., [6] ) inclusion atoms are allowed to have arbitrary terms as arguments, namely strings of the form t 1 . . .t n ⊆ t ′ 1 . . .t ′ n are considered well-formed formulas, and the semantics of these inclusion atoms are defined (naturally) as:
It is easy to check that inclusion atoms of this type are definable in our version of inclusion logic, since t ⊆ t ′ ≡ ∃xy(x = t ∧ y = t ′ ∧ x ⊆ y), where ∃v abbreviates ∃v 1 . . . ∃v k for some k, and u = v is short for i u i = v i .
For any assignment s and any set V ⊆ Var of variables, we write s ↾ V for the assignment s restricted to V . For any team X, define X ↾ V = {s ↾ V | s ∈ X}. We list the most important properties of Inc-formulas in the following lemma. The reader is referred to [6, 8] for other properties. 
(Flatness of First-order Formulas): For any first-order formula α,
Consequently, first-order formulas are also downwards closed, that is, M |= X α and Y ⊆ X imply M |= Y α.
If θ is a sentence, the locality property implies that
θ . By the result of [6] , Inc sentences can be translated into existential second-order logic (ESO), namely, for every Inc-sentence θ , there exists a ESO-sentence τ(θ ) such that M |= θ iff M |= τ(θ ). Since ESO is well-known to be compact, it follows that Inc is compact as well, that is, if every finite subset of a set Γ of Inc-sentences has a model, then the set Γ itself has a model. It was further proved in [8] that Inc is expressively equivalent to positive greatest fixed point logic (posGFP) in the sense of the following theorem. 
and vice versa, where rel(X) = {(s(x 1 ), . . . , s(x n )) | s ∈ X} is an n-ary predicate on M that serves as the interpretation for R. In particular, Inc sentences can be translated into posGFP and vice versa.
As a consequence of [23] , over finite models, Inc and least fixed point logic have the same expressive power. In particular, by [23, 31] , over ordered finite models, Inc captures PTIME.
Due to the strong expressive power, Inc is not (effectively) axiomatizable. We now give an explicit proof of this fact by following a similar argument to that in [25] . P r o o f. It is easy to prove that ∃x∃y(y ⊆ x ∧ y < x) holds in M iff M contains an infinite descending chain · · · < a n < M · · · < a 1 < M a 0 . We leave the proof details to the reader. Now, put φ = ∃x∃y(y ⊆ x ∧ y < x), and let ¬PA be a (first-order) sentence stating that all (finitely many) axioms of Peano arithmetic except for the induction axiom fail. For any L -sentence α of arithmetic, we have
where N is the standard model of arithmetic. To see why, for the left to right direction, suppose that N |= α and that M is a model of PA such that M |= φ . By Proposition 2.4, < M is well-founded, which implies that M is (isomorphic to) the standard model N of arithmetic. Thus M |= α. Conversely, suppose |= α ∨ ¬PA ∨ φ . By Proposition 2.4, φ is not true in the standard model N of PA. Thus we must have N |= α.
The equivalence (2) shows that truth in the standard model N can be reduced to logical validity in inclusion logic. This means that validity in inclusion logic is not arithmetical, and therefore inclusion logic cannot have any (effective) complete axiomatization.
Nevertheless, there can be partial axiomatizations for the logic. The main objective of the present paper is to introduce a system of natural deduction for Inc that is complete for first-order consequences, in the sense that
The author would like to thank Jouko Väänänen for suggesting this proof, and the formula used in Proposition 2.4 is taken essentially from [8] .
holds whenever Γ is a set of Inc-formulas, and α is a first-order formula. Our completeness proof will mainly follow the argument of [25] that roughly goes as follows: First, we show that any Inc-sentence is semantically equivalent to a formula φ in certain normal form, and also in the system to be introduced every Inc-formula implies its normal form. Then, we show that φ is equivalent over countable models to a first-order sentence Φ (called its game expression) of infinite length. Next, we show that the game expression Φ can be approximated in a certain sense (in the sense of Theorem 4.2) by some first-order sentence Φ n (n ∈ ω) of finite length. Finally, making essential use of these approximations Φ n we will be able to prove the completeness theorem by certain model theoretic argument together with a trick using the weak classical negation developed in [32] .
Normal form
In this section, we prove that every Inc-formula φ (z) is (semantically) equivalent to a formula in the form ∃x∀y(ι(x, y) ∧ α(x, z)), where ι is a conjunction of inclusion atoms, and α is a first-order quantifier-free formula. This normal form is similar to the normal forms for dependence and independence logic introduced in [12, 29] , and is more refined than the two normal forms for Inc-formulas introduced in the literature, which we recall in the following.
is semantically equivalent to a formula of the form
where Q i ∈ {∃, ∀} and θ is a quantifier free formula.
Proof (sketch). This follows from the observation that if
• ∀xφ ∧ ψ ≡ ∀x(φ ∧ ψ);
, where y, z are fresh variables.
Theorem 3.2 ( [13]) Every Inc-formula φ (z) of the form (3) is semantically equivalent to a formula of the form
where
y is fresh and θ is the quantifier free formula in (3).
Proof (idea). This is proved by exhaustively applying the equivalences
and
We show next that the quantifier-free formula θ in the above two theorems can be turned into an equivalent formula in some normal form.
Lemma 3.3 Every quantifier-free Inc-formula θ (z) is semantically equivalent to a formula of the form
where α is a first-order quantifier-free formula, and each u i and v i are sequences of variables from w.
P r o o f. We prove the lemma by induction on θ . The case θ being a first-order formula is trivial.
Assume that θ 0 = ∃w 0 (ι 0 (w 0 ) ∧ α 0 (w 0 , x)) and θ 1 = ∃w 1 (ι 1 (w 1 ) ∧ α 1 (w 1 , y)), where α 0 , α 1 are first-order and quantifier-free, the sequences w 0 and w 1 do not have variables in common,
If
We first claim that for any first-order formula α, any Inc-formula φ ,
where each u i and v i consist of variables from the sequence x = x 1 , . . . , x n . Then can prove θ 0 ∨ θ 1 ≡ ψ by consecutively applying (10) as follows:
(by (4)) We now finish the proof by verifying the claim (10) . For the direction left to right, suppose
We omit here the precise technical definition.
• Define H :
For the former, define
For the direction right to left of the claim (10), suppose there are suitable (sequence of) functions F = F 1 , . . . , F n , G, H for the quantifications ∃x∃p∃q such that for
Define a suitable sequence of functions
We omit the precise technical definition here. Now, since
as U was assumed to be the maximal subteam of W that satisfies α(x, z).
Finally, applying the above normal form results we obtain the desired more refined normal form as follows. Theorem 3.4 Every Inc-formula φ (z) is semantically equivalent to a formula of the form
P r o o f. By Theorem 3.1, we may assume that φ is in prenex normal form (3) . Furthermore, by Lemma 3.3, the quantifier free formula θ in (3) is equivalent to a formula of the form (7). Hence, φ (z) is equivalent to a formula of the form
Finally, applying Theorem 3.2 to the above formula (and rearranging the order of the existential quantifiers) we obtain an equivalent formula of the form (11).
To simplify notations in the normal form (11), we now introduce some conventions. For any permutation f : {1, . . . , n} → {1, . . . , n} and k ≤ n, we define a function σ
x is a sequence of variables from x. When no confusion arises we drop the superscripts in σ f,k x and write simply σ x . We reserve the greek letters π, ρ, σ , τ (with or without superscripts) for such functions. The normal form of an Inc-sentence (with no free variables) can then be written as
Observe that the formula in the above normal form has only one (explicit) universal quantifier (i.e., ∀y), and yet, some existentially quantified variables from x are essentially universally quantified, as ensured by the inclusion atoms π j x y ⊆ τ j x (cf. Equivalence (6)).
Game expression and approximations
In this section, we define the game expression Φ for every Inc-sentence φ in normal form. Intuitively the formula Φ is a first-order sentence of infinite length that simulates all possible plays in the semantic game (in team semantics) of the formula φ , and we will show that over countable models Φ and φ are equivalent. For a game of finite length n, we define a first-order formula Φ n of finite length, called the n-approximation of Φ. It follows from the model-theoretic argument in [25] that Φ is equivalent to the (infinitary) conjunction of all its approximations Φ n over countable recursively saturated models. These game expressions and their finite approximations will be essential for proving the completeness theorem for the system of Inc to be introduced in the next section. Now, let φ be an Inc-sentence (with no free variables). By Theorem 3.4, we may assume that φ is in normal form (12) . We now define the game expression of φ as the following first-order sentence Φ of infinite length:
where 
The formula Φ is defined in layers that correspond essentially to the plays in the semantic game of the formula φ (see e.g., [5] for the definition of the semantic game for Inc). Each layer of Φ consists of the subformula
. The intuitive reading of each layer is as follows: Each layer introduces new existentially quantified variables w n x n and one universally quantified variable y n , and specifies (via α n ) that α holds for the existentially quantified variables w n x n . For each inclusion atom ρ i w ⊆ σ i w in φ , with respect to each sequence w ξ of existentially quantified variables introduced in layer n − 1, a witness sequence w ξ ,i of variables (as specified via the formula γ n ) together with the accompanying sequence x ξ ,i are introduced in layer n as part of w n x n . Similarly, for each inclusion atom π j x y ⊆ τ j x in φ , with respect to each new combination x ξ y η ∈ A n of existentially quantified variables x ξ introduced up to layer n − 1 and universally quantified variables y η introduced up to layer n, a witness sequence x ξ η, j of variables (as specified via the formula δ n ) together with the accompanying sequence w ξ ,i are introduced in layer n as part of w n x n .
We assume that the reader is familiar with the game-theoretic semantics of first-order and infinitary logic. Let us now recall the semantic game G(M, Φ) of the formula Φ over a model M, which is an infinite game played between two players ∀belard and ∃loise. At each round the players take turns to pick elements from M for the quantified variables w n x n and y n as illustrated in the following table:
The choices of the two players generate an assignment s for the quantified variables w n x n y n defined as s(w n x n ) = a n b n and s(y n ) = c n .
The player ∃loise wins the (infinite) game if for each natural number n,
Finally, M |= Φ ⇐⇒ ∃loise has a winning strategy in the game G(M, Φ),
where a winning strategy for ∃loise is a function that tells her what to choose at each round, and guarantees her to win every play of the game. We now show that an Inc-sentence is semantically equivalent to its game expression over countable models by using the game-theoretic semantics. Theorem 4.1 Let φ be an Inc-sentence, and M a model. Then
(ii) and M |= Φ =⇒ M |= φ whenever M is a countable model.
Then, there exists a suitable sequence F of functions for ∃w∃x such that for X = { / 0}(F/wx),
We prove M |= Φ by constructing a winning strategy for ∃loise in the semantic game G(M, Φ) as follows:
• In round 0, choose any assignment s in X(M/y), and let ∃loise choose a 0 = s(w) and b 0 = s(x). Let s 0 be the assignment for w 0 x 0 generated by ∃loise's choices so far. By (13), we have M |= s α(w, x), which implies M |= s 0 α 0 (w 0 , x 0 ), thus the winning condition is maintained.
• Let s n−1 be the assignment generated by the choices of the two players up to round n − 1. Assume that we have maintained that for each w ξ x ξ in the domain of s n−1 , the assignment s ξ for wx defined as s ξ (wx) = s n−1 (w ξ x ξ ) is in X, and assume that ∀belard has chosen b n in round n.
-For any ξ η ∈ A n with a ξ b ξ c η the corresponding choices by the two players in (at most) two earlier than n rounds, the assignment
Clearly, δ n is satisfied by the assignment generated by the players' choices so far.
-Similarly, for any ξ ∈ E n−1 and any i ∈ I, by using the fact that s ξ ∈ X and M |= X(M/y) ρ i w ⊆ σ i w , we can let ∃loise choose a ξ ,i b ξ ,i so that γ n is satisfied by the assignment generated by the players' choices so far, and s ξ ,i ∈ X.
Moreover, since M |= X(M/y) α(w, x) and we have maintained that s ξ ∈ X for each ξ ∈ E n ∪U n , we conclude that each α(w ξ , x ξ ) is satisfied by the assignment s n generated by the choices of the players till round n.
(ii) Suppose M is a countable model of Φ, and ∃loise has a winning strategy in the game G(M, Φ). Let c n n<ω enumerate all elements of M, and let ∀belard play c n at each round n. Suppose s is the assignment generated by such choices of ∀belard and the corresponding choices of ∃loise given by her winning strategy. Let X = {s ξ | ξ ∈ E n ∪U n , n < ω}, where recall that s ξ is the assignment for wx defined as s ξ (wx) = s(w ξ x ξ ). Observe that X = { / 0}(F/wx) for some suitable sequence F of functions for ∃w∃x. To show M |= φ , it suffices to verify that the team X(M/y) satisfies (13) .
To see that M |= X(M/y) α(w, x), for any s ξ (c η /y) ∈ X(M/y), since ∃loise wins the game, we know that M |= s α(w ξ , x ξ ), which implies M |= s ξ α(w, x), as desired.
To see that X(M/y) satisfies each π j x y ⊆ τ j x , take any s ξ (c η /y) ∈ X(M/y) and assume ξ η ∈ A n . Since ∃loise wins the game, s satisfies δ n , and in particular, M |= s π j x ξ y η = τ j x ξ η, j . Thus, for any extension s ′ ∈ X(M/y) of s ξ η, j ∈ X, we have s
, as required. By a similar argument, we can also show that X(M/y) satisfies each ρ i w ⊆ σ i w . This then finishes the proof.
For each natural number n < ω, we define the n-approximation Φ n of the infinitary sentence Φ as the finite first-order formula
The semantic game for Φ n over a model M, denoted by G(M, Φ n ), is defined exactly as the infinite game G(M, Φ) except that G(M, Φ n ) has only n + 1 rounds. Using the game theoretic-semantics we show, as in [25] , that Φ n 's do approximate Φ over recursively saturated models, which (recall from, e.g., [1] ) are models M such that
whenever the set {φ n (x, y) | n < ω} is recursive.
Theorem 4.2 If M is a recursively saturated (or finite) model, then
M |= Φ ⇐⇒ M |= Φ n for all n < ω.
In particular, if M is a recursively saturated countable (or finite) model, then
M |= φ ⇐⇒ M |= Φ n for all n < ω.
P r o o f. The "in particular" part follows from Theorem 4.1. The direction "=⇒" of the main claim follows from the observation that a winning strategy for ∃loise in the infnite game G(M, Φ) is clearly also a winning strategy for ∃loise in the finite game G(M, Φ n ) for every n < ω. The other direction "⇐=" follows from a similar argument to that of Proposition 15 in [25] , which we omit here.
A system of natural deduction for Inc
In this section, we introduce a system of natural deduction for Inc and prove the soundness theorem of the system. We also prove that the normal form of an Inc-formula is derivable in the system from the formula itself.
Definition 5.1 The system of natural deduction for Inc consists of the rules for equality, connectives and quantifiers given in Table 1 , and the following rules for inclusion atoms, where α ranges over first-order formulas, and the letters x, y, z, . . . in serif font stand for arbitrary (possibly empty) sequences of variables.
z does not occur freely in any formula in the undischarged assumptions of the derivation D.
We write Γ ⊢ Inc φ or simply Γ ⊢ φ if φ is derivable from the set Γ of formulas by applying the rules of the system of Inc. We write simply φ ⊢ ψ for {φ } ⊢ ψ. Two formulas φ and ψ are said to be provably equivalent, written φ ⊣⊢ ψ, if both φ ⊢ ψ and ψ ⊢ φ .
Restricted to first-order formulas only, our system contains all rules of first-order logic (with equality), as shown in Table 1 . But classical rules do not in general apply to non-classical formulas of Inc, in particular, the rules for negation and ∀E are not in general sound for arbitrary formulas. As a consequence, our system does not admit Uniform Substitution.
While the usual elimination rule for disjunction (∨E) is not sound in dependence and independence logic ( [12, 25] ), the disjunction of Inc does admit ∨E under a subttle side condition, which, among other things, makes the usual derivation of the distributive law φ ∧ (ψ ∨ χ)/(φ ∧ ψ) ∨ (φ ∧ χ) not applicable in the system. Indeed, this distributive law fails in Inc for φ being not closed downwards. The nonstandard feature of the disjunction are also reflected in the rules ∀Ext and ⊆ Dstr that describe the interactions between disjunction and ∀ and inclusion atoms. These two rules are in a sense ad hoc to the present system, and simplifying these rules is left as future work.
The universal quantifier of Inc turns out to be a peculiar connective in that the usual elimination rule ∀xφ /φ (t/x) is not in general sound for arbitrary formulas. For instance, we have |= ∀x(y ⊆ x), whereas |= y ⊆ z. The two weaker elimination rules ∀E and ∀E 0 we include in the system restrict the subformula φ in the premise either to a first-order formula or a formula in which x is not free. To compensate the weakness of the elimination rules we also add to our system a substitution rule ∀Sub and an exchange rule ∀Exc. In this nonstandard setting, the derivations of some natural and simple rules for universal quantifier become not entirely trivial, as we will illustrate in the next proposition.
(iii) ∀x(φ ∧ ψ) ⊢ ∀xφ ∧ ∀xψ.
P r o o f. (i)
. By ∀Sub and ∀E 0 we derive ∀x∀yφ ⊢ ∀y∀yφ (y/x) ⊢ ∀yφ (y/x). Next, to show ∀x∀yφ ⊢ ∀xφ (x/y), first apply ∀Exc to derive ∀x∀yφ ⊢ ∀y∀xφ , and then ∀y∀xφ ⊢ ∀xφ (x/y) follows by the same argument.
(ii). Since y / ∈ Fv(∀xφ ), we derive by ∀I that ∀xφ ⊢ ∀y∀xφ . Then, ∀xφ ⊢ ∀yφ (y/x) follows from item (i). (iii). Since φ ∧ ψ ⊢ φ , by ∀Sub we derive ∀x(φ ∧ ψ) ⊢ ∀xφ . Similarly ∀x(φ ∧ ψ) ⊢ ∀xψ. Thus ∀x(φ ∧ ψ) ⊢ ∀xφ ∧ ∀xψ follows from ∧I.
The exchange rule ⊆ Exc and contraction rule ⊆ Ctr for inclusion atoms in our system together with the rule xy ⊆ uv/xyy ⊆ uvv that we will derive in the next proposition is clearly equivalent to the projection rule [12] . The projection rule, ⊆ Trs and the reflexivity axiom 
The undischarged assumptions in the derivations D 0 and D 1 contain first-order formulas only.
x does not occur freely in ψ or in any formula in the undischarged assumptions of D 1 .
x does not occur freely in any formula in the undischarged assumptions of D.
y does not occur freely in ∀xφ or any formula in the undischarged assumptions of D 1 .
x ⊆ x that we will also derive below form a complete axiomatization of the implication problem of inclusion dependencies in database theory ( [4] ). The compression rule ⊆ Cmp was introduced in [12] , and the weakening rule via existential quantifier ⊆W ∃ was essentially introduced in [17] . The weakening rule via universal quantifer ⊆W ∀ is similar to ⊆W ∃ . The simulation rule ∀⊆Sim is invertiable (i.e., the rule can be applied in both directions), and it describes the fact that universal quantifiers can be simulated by existential quantifiers with the help of inclusion atoms. The rule ⊆ Dstr is a distributive rule over disjunction for formulas containing inclusion atoms.
(ii) If x| = |y| = |z|, then xy ⊆ zz ⊢ x = y. P r o o f. (i) By = I we have ⊢ x = x, which implies, by ∀I, that ⊢ ∀z(x = x). Now, by applying ∀⊆ Sim we derive ⊢ ∃z∀y(xy ⊆ xz ∧ x = x), which implies that ⊢ ∃z∀y(x ⊆ x) by ⊆ Ctr. Thus, by ∃E and ∀E 0 , we derive finally ⊢ x ⊆ x.
(ii) We first derive ⊢ z = z by = I. Then we derive by applying ⊆ Cmp that xy ⊆ zz, z = z ⊢ x = y. Hence xy ⊆ zz ⊢ x = y.
(iii) By ⊆ W ∃ we have xy ⊆ uv ⊢ ∃z(xyz ⊆ uvv). By item (ii), we have xyz ⊆ uvv ⊢ y = z. Thus, xy ⊆ uv ⊢ ∃z(xyz ⊆ uvv ∧ y = z) ⊢ xyy ⊆ uvv by = Sub.
We now prove the Soundness Theorem of our system. ∨E: It suffices to show that ∆ 0 , φ |= χ and
It then follows from the assumption that M |= Y χ and M |= Z χ. Now, since χ is closed under unions, we conclude that M |= X χ, as required.
and G(s) = {a}.
Now, we split the team
and α is first-order, we have M |= s ′ α(x), which implies M |= s α(y/x) by the locality property. Hence, we conclude that M |= X α(y/x). ⊆ W ∃ : It suffices to show that Γ |= ∃w(xw ⊆ yz) assuming Γ |= x ⊆ y. Suppose M |= X φ for all φ ∈ Γ. By the assumption, M |= X x ⊆ y, meaning that for any s ∈ X, there exists s ′ ∈ X such that s ′ (y) = s(x). Now, to show that M |= X ∃w(xw ⊆ yz), we define a function F :
⊆ W ∀ : It suffices to show that Γ |= ∀z(xw ⊆ yz) assuming Γ |= x ⊆ y, where z does not occur freely in any formula in Γ. Suppose M |= X φ for all φ ∈ Γ, where we may assume w.l.o.g. that w ∈ dom(X) and z / ∈ dom(X). It then follows that M |= X(M/z) φ also holds for all φ ∈ Γ. To show M |= X(M/z) xw ⊆ yz, take an arbitrary s ∈ X(M/z). Since we have M |= X(M/z) x ⊆ y by the assumption, there exists s ′ ∈ X(M/z) such that s ′ (y) = s(x). Clearly, the assignment s ′′ = s ′ (s(w)/z) belongs to the team X(M/z), and s ′′ (yz) = s ′ (y)s(w) = s(xw), as required.
∀⊆ Sim: For the top to bottom direction, suppose M |= X ∀xφ (x, z). We show that M |= X ∃x∀y zy ⊆ zx ∧ φ (x, z) , where variables from y are fresh. Define a sequence F of functions for ∃x by taking For the bottom to top direction, suppose M |= X ∃x∀y zy ⊆ zx ∧ φ (x, z) , where no variable from y are free in φ , and we may assume w.l.o.g. that dom(X) consists of all variables from z. Then there are suitable sequence F of functions for ∃x such that , z) , which, by locality, is further reduced to showing that X(F/x) = X(M/x).
For any s ∈ X(M/x), consider an arbitrary assignment t ∈ X(F/x)(M/y) satisfying t(z) = s(z) and t(y) = s(x).
We will prove the completeness theorem of our system in the next section. An important lemma for this proof states that every formula provably implies its normal form (12) . To prove this lemma we first prove a few useful propositions.
The next three propositions concern the standard properties of quantifications as well as the monotonicity of the entailment relation in Inc. In the sequel, we will often apply Propositions 5.5 and 5.6 without explicit references to them.
Proposition 5.5 Let x /
∈ Fv(ψ).
P r o o f. Items (ii) and (iii) are proved as usual. We only derive item (i). For the right to left direction, we have by Proposition 5.2(iii) that ∀x(φ ∧ ψ) ⊢ ∀xφ ∧ ∀xψ. Since x / ∈ Fv(ψ), ∀xψ ⊢ ψ. Thus ∀x(φ ∧ ψ) ⊢ ∀xφ ∧ ψ. For the other direction, since φ , ψ ⊢ φ ∧ ψ and x / ∈ Fv(ψ), we derive by applying ∀Sub that ∀xφ , ψ ⊢ ∀x(φ ∧ ψ), which then implies ∀xφ ∧ ψ ⊣⊢ ∀x(φ ∧ ψ).
We write φ (θ ) to indicate that φ is a formula that has as occurrence of θ as a subformula, and write φ [θ ′ /θ ] for the formula obtained from φ by replacing the occurrence of θ by θ ′ . The next technical proposition concerns simulating universal quantifiers using existential quantifiers and inclusion atoms.
Proposition 5.8 ∀xQuφ (u, x, z) ⊣⊢ ∃xQu∀y zy ⊆ zx ∧ φ (u, x, z) . P r o o f. We derive the proposition as follows:
⊣⊢ ∃x ∀y(zy ⊆ zx) ∧ Quφ (u, x, z)
⊣⊢ ∃xQu ∀y(zy ⊆ zx) ∧ φ (u, x, z)
⊣⊢ ∃xQu∀y zy ⊆ zx ∧ φ (u, x, z) .
Lemma 5.9
For any Inc-formula φ , we have φ ⊢ φ ′ , where φ ′ is the semantically equivalent formula in normal form (11) as given in Theorem 3.4. P r o o f. We follow a similar argument to that of the semantic proof of Theorem 3.4. First, by Proposition 5.7, we obtain φ ⊢ Qxθ , where Qxθ is the semantically equivalent formula of φ as given in Theorem 3.1 with Qx = Q 1 x 1 · · · Q n x n a sequence of quantifiers and θ a quantifier free formula.
If we can show θ ⊢ ∃wθ ′ for some formula θ ′ = i∈I u i ⊆ v i ∧ α(w, x, z) of the form (7) as given in Lemma 3.3, then we may obtain φ ⊢ Qx∃wθ ′ by Proposition 5.6. By exhaustedly applying Proposition 5.8, we derive
where y = y j | Q j = ∀, 1 ≤ j ≤ n . Next, by repeatedly applying Proposition 5.2(i), we derive
Putting all these together, we will complete the proof. Now, we show that θ ⊢ ∃wθ ′ by induction on θ . The case θ is a first-order formula is trivial. If θ = x ⊆ y, we have x ⊆ y ⊢ ∃wu w ⊆ u ∧ w = x ∧ u = y . Indeed, we first derive ⊢ x = x ∧ y = y ⊢ ∃w∃u(w = x ∧ u = y) by = I and ∃I. Thus, by = Sub we derive y) ), where α 0 , α 1 are first-order and quantifier-free, the sequences w 0 and w 1 do not have variables in common, and ι 0 and ι 1 are as in (8) in the proof of Lemma 3.3.
If θ = θ 0 ∧ θ 1 , then by Proposition 5.
If θ = θ 0 ∨ θ 1 , let ψ be the formula (9) as in the proof of the disjunction case of Lemma 3.3. We derive θ ⊢ ψ by following the semantic argument as in Lemma 3.3, in which we apply the rule ⊆ Dstr in the crucial steps.
We end this section by proving some facts concerning the weak classical negation∼ in the context of Inc. This connective was introduced in [32] in order to generalize the technique for the proof of the completeness theorem developed in [25] . We will also apply this trick of∼ in the next section to prove the completeness theorem for our system. Recall that the team semantics of∼ is defined as
The weak classical negations∼ of Inc-formulas are not in general expressible in Inc (for existential second-order logic, being more expressive than Inc, is not closed under classical negation). Nevertheless, the weak classical negations∼ α of first-order formulas α are expressible in Inc: Fact 5.10 If α(x) is a first-order formula, then∼ α(x) ≡ ∃y(y ⊆ x ∧ ¬α(y/x)).
Stipulating the string∼ α(x) as a shorthand for the formula ∃y(y ⊆ x ∧ ¬α(y)) of Inc, we show next that the reductio ad absurdum (RAA) rule for∼ (with respect to first-order formulas) is derivable in our system for Inc.
Lemma 5.11 If Γ,∼ α ⊢ ⊥, then Γ ⊢ α.
P r o o f. Suppose Γ,∼ α ⊢ ⊥. In view of RAA (for ¬) it suffices to show Γ, ¬α ⊢ ⊥. Let x list all free variables in α. By Proposition 5.3(i), we have ⊢ x ⊆ x, which implies ⊢ ∃y(y ⊆ x) by ∃I. Then, by ⊆ Cmp we derive that Γ, ¬α(x) ⊢ ∃y(y ⊆ x ∧ ¬α(x)) ⊢ ∃y(y ⊆ x ∧ ¬α(y/x)) ⊢∼ α(x). Now, since Γ,∼ α ⊢ ⊥, we conclude that Γ, ¬α ⊢ ⊥.
The completeness theorem
In this section, we prove the completeness theorem for our system of Inc with respect to first-order consequences.
To be precise, we will prove that
holds whenever Γ is a set of Inc-formulas, and α is a first-order formula. As sketched in Section 2, our proof combines the technique introduced in [25] and a trick involving the weak classical negation∼ and the RAA rule for∼ developed in [32] . The former treats the case when the set Γ ∪ {α} of formulas in (14) are sentences (with no free variables) only, while the trick of the latter allows us to handle (open) formulas as well. Since the weak classical negation∼ α of a first-order formula α is expressible in Inc (Fact 5.10) and the RAA rule for∼ is derivable in our system of Inc (Lemma 5.11), the trick of [32] can be applied smoothly for Inc (in contrast to the cases for dependence and independence logic in which the RAA rule for∼ has to be added manually, as in done in [32] ). We have prepared in the previous sections most relevant lemmas for the argument in [25] concerning the normal form of Inc-formulas (especially Lemma 5.9), and the game expression and approximations. Another important lemma leading to the completeness theorem is that any Inc-formula φ implies every approximation Φ n of its game expression as introduced in Section 4.
Lemma 6.1 For any Inc-sentence φ , we have φ ⊢ Φ n for every n < ω. In order to prove the above lemma, we first need to prove a number of technical propositions and lemmas.
where |x| = |x 0 | = |x 1 |, |y| = |y 0 | = |y 1 | and |z| = |z 0 |. In particular, when z and z 0 are the empty sequence,
P r o o f. Assume that p(x) = σ x τ x for some permutation p of the sequence x. Then we have the following derivation:
We say that an occurrence of a subformula θ in φ (θ ) is not in the scope of a disjunction if (1) φ = θ ; or (2) φ = ψ(θ ) ∧ χ or χ ∧ ψ(θ ), and θ is not in the scope of a disjunction in ψ(θ ); or (3) φ = Qxψ(θ ) (Q ∈ {∀, ∃}) and θ is not in the scope of a disjunction in ψ(θ ). For example, in the formula (φ (θ ) ∨ ψ) ∧ ∃xθ , the leftmost occurrence of θ is in the scope of a disjunction, while the rightmost occurrence of θ is not. P r o o f. We prove the proposition by induction on φ . If φ = x ⊆ y, since no variable from z occurs in x ⊆ y, we derive by ∀E 0 that ∀z(x ⊆ y) ⊢ x ⊆ y. Next, we obtain by ⊆ W ∀ that x ⊆ y ⊢ ∀z(xw ⊆ yz). Thus, ∀z(x ⊆ y) ⊢ ∀z(xw ⊆ yz) follows.
If φ = ψ(x ⊆ y) ∧ χ, then we have
This finishes the proof.
Finally, we are in a position to prove the completeness theorem of our system. Theorem 6.5 (Completeness) Let Γ be a set of Inc-formulas, and α a first-order formula. Then
P r o o f. The direction "⇐=" follows from the soundness theorem. For the direction "=⇒", suppose Γ |= α and Γ Inc α. Since Inc is compact, without loss of generality we may assume that Γ is finite. Claim that ∃z( Γ ∧∼ α) Inc ⊥, where z lists all free variables in Γ and∼ α. Indeed, if ∃z( Γ ∧∼ α) ⊢ Inc ⊥, then we derive Γ,∼ α ⊢ Inc ⊥ by ∃I, and further Γ ⊢ Inc α by Lemma 5.11; a contradiction. Now, let ∆ = {Φ n | φ = ∃z( Γ ∧∼ α) and n < ω}. By Lemma 6.1, we must have ∆ Inc ⊥. Thus ∆ FO ⊥, as the deduction system of Inc has the same rules as that of first-order logic when restricted to first-order formulas. By the Completeness Theorem of first-order logic, we know that the set ∆ of first-order formulas has a model M. By [1] , every infinite model is elementary equivalent to a recursively saturated countable model. Thus, we may assume that M is a recursively saturated countable or finite model. By Theorem 4.2, M is also a model of ∃z( Γ ∧∼ α), thereby M |= { / 0}(F/z) Γ and M |= { / 0}(F/z) α for some suitable sequence F of functions for ∃z. Hence Γ |= α.
Applications
In this final section of the paper, we illustrate further the power our system of Inc by showing some applications of our proof system.
Recall from Proposition 2.4 that the sentence ∃x∃y(y ⊆ x ∧ y < x) defines the fact that < is not well-founded. By the completeness theorem (Theorem 6.5) we proved in the previous section, all first-order consequences of the non-well-foundedness of < are derivable in our system. For instance, the property that there is a <-chain of length n for any natural number n, and that this <-chain of length n descends from the greatest element in case a greatest element exists. We now give explicit derivations of these properties in the example below.
Example 7.1 Write x 1 < x 2 < · · · < x n for n−1 i=1 x i < x i+1 . For any n, (i) ∃x∃y(y ⊆ x ∧ y < x) ⊢ ∃x 1 . . . ∃x n (x 1 < x 2 < · · · < x n ),
(ii) ∃x∃y(y ⊆ x ∧ y < x), ∀y(y < x 0 ∨ y = x 0 ) ⊢ ∃x 1 . . . ∃x n (x 1 < · · · < x n < x 0 ).
P r o o f. (i)
We only give an example of the proof for n = 3.
∃x∃y(y ⊆ x ∧ y < x) ⊢∃x∃y∃z(yz ⊆ xy ∧ y < x) (⊆ W ∃ ) ⊢∃x∃y∃z(yz ⊆ xy ∧ z < y ∧ y < x) (⊆ Cmp) ⊢∃x∃y∃z(z < y ∧ y < x) (∧E) ⊢∃x 1 ∃x 2 ∃x 3 (x 1 < x 2 ∧ x 2 < x 3 ) (renaming bound variables)
(ii) In view of item (i), it suffices to show ∃x 1 . . . ∃x n (x 1 < · · · < x n ), ∀y(y < x 0 ∨ y = x 0 ) ⊢ ∃x 1 . . . ∃x n (x 1 < · · · < x n < x 0 ). But this is derivable in the system of first-order logic, and the same proof can also be performed in the system of Inc.
It is interesting to note that the formulas on the right side of the turnstile (⊢) in the derivable clauses in Proposition 5.3(i)(iii) are not first-order formulas. While our completeness theorem (Theorem 6.5) does not apply to these cases, these clauses are indeed derivable. We now give some more examples in which our system can be successfully applied to derive non-first-order consequences in Inc.
Consider the so-called anonymity atoms, introduced originally in [5] and studied recently by Väänänen [30] with the motivation of the concerns in data safety. These are strings of the form x 1 . . . x n ϒy 1 . . . y m with the team semantics:
• M |= X xϒy iff for all s ∈ X, there exists s ′ ∈ X such that s(x) = s ′ (x) and s(y) = s ′ (y).
Note that the anonymity atoms corresponds exactly to afunctional dependencies studied in database theory (see e.g., [2, 3] ). It was proved in [5] that first-order logic extended with anonymity atoms is expressively equivalent to inclusion logic, and in particular, xϒy ≡ ∃v(xv ⊆ xy ∧ v = y), where v = y is short for i v i = y i . We will then use xϒy as a shorthand for the above Inc-formula. Write ϒx for ϒx, and similarly for xϒ, for which we stipulate that xϒ := ⊥. The implication problem of anonymity atoms is shown in [30] to be completely axiomatized by the rules listed in the next example (read the clauses in the example as rules). We now illustrate that in our system of Inc all these rules are derivable. Example 7.2 (i) wxyzϒpuvq ⊢ wyxzϒpuvq ∧ wxyzϒpvuq (permutation)
(ii) xyϒz ⊢ xϒzu (monotonicity) (iii) xyϒzy ⊢ xyϒz (weakening) (iv) xϒ ⊢ ⊥ P r o o f. Items (i) and (iv) are trivial. We only prove the other two items. For item (ii), note that xyϒz := ∃v(xyv ⊆ xyz ∧ v = z), and we have ∃v(xyv ⊆ xyz ∧ v = z) ⊢∃v(xv ⊆ xz ∧ v = z) (⊆ Ctr) ⊢∃vw(xvw ⊆ xzu ∧ v = z) (⊆ W ∃ ) ⊢∃vw(xvw ⊆ xzu ∧ vw = zu) (∨I) =: xϒzu.
For item (iii), note that xyϒzy := ∃uv(xyuv ⊆ xyzy ∧ uv = zy), and we have ∃uv(xyuv ⊆ xyzy ∧ uv = zy) ⊢∃uv(xyuv ⊆ xyzy ∧ uv = zy ∧ y = v) (Prop. 5.3(ii)) ⊢∃uv(xyuv ⊆ xyzy ∧ u = z) ⊢∃u(xyu ⊆ xyz ∧ u = z) (⊆ Ctr) =:xyϒz.
The above example indicates that the actual strength of our deduction system of Inc goes beyond the completeness theorem (Theorem 6.5) proved in this paper. How far can we actually go then? There are obviously barriers, as inclusion logic cannot be effectively axiomatized after all. For instance, in the context of anonymity atoms, the author has failed to find a proof for a simple (sound) implication "ϒx and x ⊆ y imply ϒy" in the system of Inc introduced in this paper. An easy solution for generating derivations of simple facts like this one would be to extend the current system with new rules. But then how many new rules or which new rules should we add to the current system in order to derive "sufficient" amount of sound consequences of Inc? One such candidate that is worth mentioning is the natural and handy rule φ ∨ ¬α, α ∨ ψ/φ ∨ ψ (for α being first-order) that is sound and does not seem to be derivable in our system. Finding other such rules is left for future research.
